Bargaining with Noisy Delegation
研究委托人在纳什讨价还价模型中向代理人委托，但指令传递有噪音。数值方法找到委托人策略的唯一均衡，代理人可能无法达成一致而触发仲裁。不确定性趋零时，从多重均衡中识别出稳定极限均衡。
Principals delegate to an agent in the context of the Nash bargaining model, but communicate instructions to their agents imperfectly. Numerical methods are used to find a unique equilibrium in the principals' strategies. Agents fail to agree with a positive probability, invoking a secondary mechanism for the resolution of disputes such as arbitration. Comparative statics are informative. The risk sensitivity of the Nash bargaining solution is mitigated but not eliminated. As uncertainty goes to zero, a stable unique limiting equilibrium is identified from the set of multiple equilibria identified in a model in which principals delegate without trembles.