Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia
通过赞比亚实验发现，与丈夫共同获得避孕服务的女性比单独获得的女性更少使用避孕、更多生育，但单独获得的女性主观幸福感更低，表明家庭内部道德风险影响生育决策。
We posit that household decision-making over fertility is characterized by moral hazard since most contraception can only be perfectly observed by the woman. Using an experiment in Zambia that varied whether women were given access to contraceptives alone or with their husbands, we find that women given access with their husbands were 19 percent less likely to seek family planning services, 25 percent less likely to use concealable contraception, and 27 percent more likely to give birth. However, women given access to contraception alone report a lower subjective well-being, suggesting a psychosocial cost of making contraceptives more concealable.