Optimality and Sustainability: Regulation and Intermodal Competition in Telecommunications
研究公用事业在面临大客户有替代服务选择时的最优定价策略，证明在非线性定价下，公用事业可合法地将高用量定价低于边际成本，且客户能做出经济高效的选择。
As regulators continue to open utility markets to entry, new market contestants may specialize in providing service for the utility's largest customers. Consequently, old utility pricing procedures may no longer be sustainable. Taking telecommunications regulation as an example, this article develops optimal pricing strategies for utilities that have large customers who have other attractive service options. I demonstrate that under an optimal nonuniform price schedule, utilities can legitimately price high-level usage below its associated marginal usage cost. Furthermore, customers will make economically efficient choices when deciding whether to forego utility service.