Ownership Dynamics and Asset Pricing with a Large Shareholder
分析大股东在分散投资与监督激励之间的权衡，发现无承诺时大股东最终会交易到竞争性价格接受者配置，即使这导致监督效率低下，并探讨了对资产定价、IPO抑价和锁定期条款的影响。
We analyze the optimal trading and ownership policy of a large shareholder who must trade off diversification and monitoring incentives. Without commitment, the problem is similar to durable goods monopoly: the share price today depends on expected future trades. We show that the large shareholder ultimately trades to the competitive price-taking allocation, even though it entails inefficient monitoring. With continuous trading, the large shareholder trades immediately to this allocation if moral hazard is weak enough that her private valuation of a share is decreasing in her stake. Otherwise, the large shareholder adjusts her stake gradually. We consider implications for asset pricing, IPO underpricing, and lockup provisions.