THE FIT BETWEEN CEO COMPENSATION DESIGN AND FIRM RISK.
研究了非系统风险和系统风险对CEO薪酬风险承担及总薪酬的影响，发现可变薪酬比例和总薪酬与非系统风险呈曲线关系，在中等风险水平下最高。
We examined the effects of unsystematic and systematic firm risk on CEO compensation risk bearing and total pay. Both the proportion of variable pay in the CEO pay package and the magnitude of the CEO pay package are curvilinearly related to unsystematic firm risk, i.e. they are highest under conditions of moderate firm-specific risk. Our results are consistent with agency predictions that both performance contingent pay and the greater earnings potential associated with that form of pay are highest when the agent has greater control over performance outcomes. In Press- AMJ 4 Recent research on CEO pay has moved away from decades of mostly futile attempts to find blanket evidence of incentive alignment (linking a portion of executive pay to specific performance criteria) at the top executive ranks. Instead, scholars are shifting their attention towards the identification of those conditions where incentive alignment, and thus risk sharing with CEOs, is most appropriate (e.g., Bloom & Milkovich, 1998; Gray & Canella, 1997). Most of this literature has relied on agency theory to predict those situations where placing some of the