开门谈判与关门谈判

Open- versus Closed-Door Negotiations

RAND Journal of Economics · 1994
被引 21
人大 AFT50ABS 4

中文导读

研究两个代理人之间的非合作谈判,其中一方代表选民。关门谈判中选民需批准最终协议,开门谈判中选民可能在中途终止谈判。分析两种机制对谈判结果的影响。

Abstract

We examine a noncooperative bargaining between two agents, one of whom (agent 1) represents a constituency. Under closed-door bargaining, constituents must approve the final bargaining agreement. In the case, constituents may also terminate bargaining after intermediate offers have been made and rejected. A learning and a arise in open-door bargaining. The former increases and the latter decreases the payoff to agent 2 from rejecting offers. The termination effect dominates, making agent 2 less likely to reject offers and hence making agent 1 more aggressive in the open-door case.

非合作谈判关门谈判开门谈判选民否决权