Multiple Market Entry, Cost Signalling and Entry Deterrence
研究低成本在位者在多市场经营时，通过跨市场联合信号而非独立信号来更有效遏制潜在进入者的策略，包括在无利可图的市场定价并退出。
A low-cost incumbent may limit price to informatively signal her cost to an uncertain potential entrant, and therefore deter entry. We enrich this model by investigating the strategic pricing behavior of the incumbent when she operates in multiple markets. We demonstrate that the low-cost incumbent's ability to separate from a ghost high-cost type is enhanced when she combines her signalling effort across markets, instead of independent signalling in each market. We show that, in the combined least-cost signalling, the low-cost incumbent limit prices in each market. In an attempt to minimize dissipative but informative signalling costs, the low-cost incumbent may enter unprofitable markets, but exit after credible separation.