Competition among Sellers in Securities Auctions
研究了卖方通过设计证券组合吸引竞标者的拍卖竞争，发现大市场中唯一均衡是纯现金拍卖，且保留价格在非看涨期权设计中不构成均衡。
We study simultaneous security-bid second-price auctions with competition among sellers for potential bidders. The sellers compete by designing ordered sets of securities that the bidders can offer as payment for the assets. Upon observing auction designs, potential bidders decide which auctions to enter. We characterize all symmetric equilibria and show that there always exist equilibria in which auctions are in standard securities or their combinations. In large markets the unique equilibrium is auctions in pure cash. We extend the model for competition in reserve prices and show that binding reserve prices never constitute equilibrium as long as equilibrium security designs are not call options.