The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition
通过936名参与者的实验，研究了责任、可验证性、声誉和竞争对信任品市场效率的影响，发现责任是关键因素，而可验证性作用有限。
Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market breakdown. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability at best a minor, effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated.