The Emerging Market for Trade Claims of Bankrupt Firms
研究美国破产法第11章下贸易债权交易的非正式市场，该市场为债权人提供退出重组的选择，降低破产成本，并为投资者创造机会。
MA small but growing market has developed for exchanging claims against debtors seeking relief under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. This market provides trade claimants an alternative to forced participation in the reorganization, thereby decreasing the costs of bankruptcy and offering new opportunities for investors. When a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, holders of the debtor's trade claims sometimes look for buyers to purchase these obligations and hence, an informal, unregulated, illiquid market has developed for them. To be considered for active trading, the claim must be against a debtor that is large or otherwise well-known. The number of debtors with trade claims trading in such markets has grown rapidly in recent years (1982 to 1991) as the pace of Chapter 11 filings has accelerated. Recent studies have focused on specific aspects of Chapter 11 reorganizations. While Brown (1989), Giammarino (1989), and Bebchuk and Chang (1992) model the conflict resolution process in bankruptcy, Weiss (1990) finds that absolute priority is violated in 29 out of 37 cases, and Eberhart, Moore, and Roenfeldt (1990) document (in a sample of 30 firms) that deviations from absolute priority in reorganizations result in gains to shareholders of, on average, 7.6% of the value of the firm. Daigle and Maloney (1994) develop a hypothesis that predicts the share of the reorganized firm value retained by old shareholders. Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) find that Chapter 11 proceedings enhance real investments of troubled firms while Eberhart