An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship Between Capital Acquisition and Bankruptcy Laws
基于美国小企业样本，研究了创业者对破产法规的认知如何影响其初始资本筹集及后续风险降低行为，发现资本筹集增加会促使风险降低活动，但与破产法规熟悉度无关。
Ineffective capital acquisition decisions at start-up may lead to business failure and bankruptcy; a result which is both costly and disruptive to the owners and other stakeholders of the firm. To cope with the risk of failure, owners embark on a variety of risk-reducing activities whereas the U.S. government attempts to moderate the downside effects of such failures through the rules surrounding bankruptcy. Previous studies imply that as owners become more aware of the protections offered through the government regulation of bankruptcy, they should become less concerned with the effects of failure and be willing to raise higher levels of initial capital. Raising higher levels of initial capital, in turn, leads owners to take actions intended to reduce firm risk and to minimize the threat to their personal financial security. Data from a sample of small firms confirm our hypothesis by showing that as the level of initial capital acquisition increases, owners embark on activities intended to reduce firm risk. However, capital acquisition is not associated with the owner's familiarity with bankruptcy regulations. As a result, governmental objectives in establishing these regulations may not be achieved. Our findings have implications for firms’ owners, consultants, and policymakers, in terms of the relationship between an entrepreneur's knowledge of bankruptcy laws and the financing of their enterprises.