Compliance and Enforcement Decisions under the National Labor Relations Act
通过建模分析雇主、工会和工人在《国家劳动关系法》下的合规与执法决策，利用1950-80年时间序列数据证实合规与执法激励对不公平劳动行为指控增长的重要性，并指出部分关键激励因素（如相对劳动成本）超出监管机构影响范围。
This article analyzes the growth of regulatory litigation under the National Labor Relations Act by modeling the compliance and enforcement decisions made by the employers, union, and workers covered by the act. An empirical analysis of the model on time-series data for 1950-80 confirms the importance of compliance and enforcement incentives in explaining the growth of unfair labor practice charges. While some actions of the National Labor Relations Board, the regulatory agency established by the act, influence these incentives and the resulting regulatory litigation, changes in some important incentives, notably relative labor costs, are beyond the board's influence. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.