Minimum Quality Standards, Fixed Costs, and Competition
研究在质量依赖固定成本的行业中实施最低质量标准的影响。标准促使高低质量企业提升质量，加剧价格竞争，降低经质量调整的价格，使所有消费者受益并提高社会福利，尤其在消费产生正外部性时更有利。
I investigate the consequences of imposing a minimum quality standard on an industry in which firms face quality-dependent fixed costs and compete in quality and price.Even though the high-quality sellers would satisfy the standard in the absence of regulation, imposing a standard leads these sellers to raise qualities.They do so in an effort to alleviate the price competition, which intensifies as a result of the low-quality sellers' having raised their qualities to meet the imposed standard.However, by its very nature, a mininmm quality standard limits the range in which producers can differentiate qualities.Hence, in the end, price competition intensifies and , prices -"corrected for quality change" " -fall.Due to the better qualities and lower hedonic prices, and compared to the unregulated equilibrium, all consumers are better off, more consumers participate in the market, and all participating consumers -including those who would consume qualities in e.xcess of the standard in the absence of regulation -select higher qualities.When the consumption of high-quality products generates positive externalities -as in the case of safety products -these results favor minimum quality standards.I also show that even in the absence of externalities an appropriately chosen standard improves social welfare.'For a description of existing regulation and a recently proposed regulation see The Wall Street Journal, April 4, 1990, page .•Mo.column 4. ^For example, the miles-per-gallon performance of new models is estimated by the EP.-\ and disclosed on the sale sticker.