On a private information game without pure strategy equilibria
给出了一个两人私人信息博弈的例子，其中不存在纯策略均衡，该例满足现有纯策略均衡存在定理的所有假设，但每个玩家的行动集是区间[-1,1]，从而揭示了标准设定下均衡纯化的局限性。
We present an example of a two-person game of private information in which there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. Our example satisfies all the hypotheses of the existence theorems present in the literature on the subject of pure strategy equilibria, except for the fact that the action set of each player is given by the interval [−1,1]. As such, it illustrates the limitations that pertain to the purification of equilibria in a standard setting.