费率基础选择与监管结构

Rate Base Selection and the Structure of Regulation

RAND Journal of Economics · 1984
被引 41
人大 AFT50ABS 4

中文导读

研究回报率监管中费率基础估值规则的作用,指出估值规则本身无固有公平性,但合理选择可解决动态一致性问题,并探讨最优规则。

Abstract

This article investigates the role played by rate base valuation rules in the context of rate of return regulation. It shows (1) that there is nothing inherently fair about any particular valuation rule, (2) that properly interpreted rate bases represent promises of future returns, (3) that valuation rules can be fairly selected from a very broad class, and (4) that, once this is recognized, rate of return regulation represents a highly effective and flexible means of avoiding the dynamic consistency problems associated with repeated regulatory reviews. In addition, the article investigates the nature of optimal rate base valuation rules.

费率基础选择回报率监管动态一致性最优监管规则