Do Lead Banks Exploit Syndicate Participants? Evidence from Ex Post Risk
研究牵头银行是否利用私有信息剥削银团参与者，发现牵头银行更倾向于将贷款份额分配给事后Z值未下降的贷款，且绩效定价条款能减少代理成本并提高银团比例。
Loan syndication involves a repeated game between lead banks and syndicate members. Lead banks do not use their private information to exploit syndicate participants but rather focus on accurately certifying loan quality. Using borrowers' financial ratios (shifts in Altman's Z scores) after origination to proxy for bank private information, we find that lead banks syndicate larger proportions of loans that subsequently do not experience lower Z scores. Performance pricing covenants under which borrowers commence to pay higher spreads if ratios (or credit ratings) deteriorate constitute a positive signal reducing agency costs and are associated with higher proportions of syndication.