On Central Bank Independence and the Stability of Policy Targets
研究了政策目标不稳定时建立独立中央银行的障碍，模型显示委托人面临可信度与灵活性的权衡，实证部分探讨了央行独立性与政策目标稳定性的相关性。
It is argued that impediments to the establishment of an independent central bank arise in the presence of unstable policy targets. Changing policy targets may occur with an office‐motivated policymaker. This differs from politico‐economic models where targets change depending on the partisanship of the politicians in office. In the model the principal faces a tradeoff between the credibility benefits of an independent central bank and the flexibility to pursue shifts in his policy targets allowed by a regime of policy discretion. An empirical section addresses the issue of the correlation between central bank independence and the stability of policy targets.