Prices vs. Quantities and Delegating Price Authority to a Monopolist
研究是否应允许垄断者自行定价，发现已有规制机制均不优于无规制垄断定价，且利润与社会净收益一致的受规制垄断者不一定适合定价，数量控制或更优，而结合两者的激励相容机制是最佳规制方案。
This paper examines the desirability of allowing a monopolist to determine the market price. We find that none of the regulatory mechanisms previously discussed in the "prices vs. quantities" literature strictly dominates unregulated, monopoly price-setting. Furthermore, despite suggestions by others, price-setting by a regulated monopolist whose profits coincide with society's net benefits is not always the most desirable means of control. Quantity-setting by such a monopolist may instead be the preferred choice. Combining both into one incentive-compatible mechanism provides the best regulatory scheme and one in which the regulator need not be informed about costs.