When Competitive Advantage Doesn't Lead to Performance: The Resource-Based View and Stakeholder Bargaining Power
整合资源基础观与议价能力文献，将企业视为契约联结，解释竞争优势产生的租金为何可能被内部利益相关者攫取，从而无法体现在绩效指标中，为理解企业绩效提供更完善的理论视角。
What if rent from a competitive advantage is appropriated so it cannot be observed in performance measures? The resource-based view was not formulated to examine who will get the rent. Yet, this essay argues that the factors leading to a resource-based advantage also predict who will appropriate rent. Knowledge-based assets are promising because firm-specificity, social complexity, and causal ambiguity make them hard to imitate. However, the roles of internal stakeholders may grant them a great deal of bargaining power especially relative to investors. This essay integrates the resource-based view with the bargaining power literature by defining the firm as a nexus of contracts. This new lens can help to explain when rent will be generated and, simultaneously, who will appropriate it. In doing so, it provides a more robust theory of firm performance than the resource-based view alone. It is also suggested that this lens might be useful for examining other theories of firm performance.