The Household Responsibility System Reform in China: A Peasant's Institutional Choice
论证农业生产从集体队制转向家庭承包制的主要原因是队制下监督困难导致劳动激励不足，并证明这一转变是帕累托改进，各省数据支持该理论和诱致性制度创新假说。
Agricultural production in China has changed from the team based system to the household based system.It is argued in this paper that the main reason for this institutional change is the difficulty of monitoring in a team mainly engaging in agricultural production.The incentives to work in a team depend on how accurately labor input is monitored.Because of the nature of agricultural production, the optimum degree of monitoring is very low and thus the incentives to work are also very low in a production team.Under some simplified assumptions, it can be proved that the change from the team system to the household system is a Paretoimprovement.The empirical data on the diffusion of the household production system in each province are found to be consistent with the above theory and with the induced institutional innovation hypothesis.,:... .