The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector
通过拟合城市交通服务合同的结构性委托代理模型，发现重新谈判阻碍了完全承诺下的最优效率，改善承诺的福利收益虽大但主要归于运营商。
Contract theory claims that renegotiation prevents attainment of the efficient solution that could be obtained under full commitment. Assessing the cost of renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint. We fit a structural principal-agent model with renegotiation on a set of contracts for urban transport services. The model captures two important features of the industry as only two types of contracts are used (fixed price and cost-plus) and subsidies are greater following a cost-plus contract than following a fixed-price one. We conclude that the welfare gains from improving commitment would be significant but would accrue mostly to operators.