RISK‐SHARING AND THE SUPPLY OF AGRICULTURAL CREDIT: A CASE STUDY OF ISLAMIC FINANCE IN SUDAN
研究了苏丹伊斯兰金融中利润与损失分担机制如何减少逆向选择和道德风险，并利用调查数据证明农业贷款回报高于非农贷款，从而解释了农业信贷供给的显著增长。
The prohibition of interest‐bearing credit and its replacement with a profit and loss sharing (PLS) system that accords with Islamic injunctions has been associated with remarkable increases in formal lending to agriculture. A model is used to show that the PLS mechanisms may reduce adverse selection and moral hazard effects as returns to both lenders and borrowers are not fixed but dependent on the actual results of credit‐financed projects. Survey data is utilised to demonstrate that the instruments employed by banks in agrarian finance provide higher returns than non‐agricultural loans, and are hence attractive despite the yield and price uncertainty characteristic of agricultural production.