Elected versus Appointed Policy Makers: Evidence from City Treasurers
研究城市财务主管的选拔方式（任命或选举）对政策效果的影响，发现任命制能降低城市借贷成本19%至31%，表明在复杂政策领域直接对选民负责可能降低绩效。
This paper investigates whether the method of selecting public officials affects policy making. I compare the policy choices of bureaucrat city treasurers and politician city treasurers, who are selected and held accountable in very different ways. The analysis draws on rich data from California to examine whether cities with appointed or elected city treasurers pay lower costs to borrow. The results demonstrate that having appointive treasurers reduces a city’s cost of borrowing by 19–31 percent. Holding officials directly accountable to voters can result in lower levels of performance in complex policy areas.