Welfare Effects of Price Discrimination by a Regulated Monopolist
研究受价格上限管制的多产品垄断企业能否进行三级价格歧视，发现若上限基于统一价格下的需求权重指数，歧视对消费者和企业都有利；若基于平均收入，则消费者偏好统一定价，歧视对总福利影响不确定，但少量歧视是可取的。
Should a multiproduct monopolist whose is capped by regulation be allowed to engage in (third-degree) price discrimination? If the cap applies to a price index with weights proportional to demands at uniform prices, then price discrimination benefits consumers as well as the firm. But if -- perhaps more realistically -- it is the firm's average revenue that is capped, then consumers prefer uniform pricing. In this case total output is higher when discrimination is allowed, which increases welfare, but marginal utilities differ across markets, which is inefficient, and the overall effect is ambiguous. A small amount of discrimination is desirable, however. It is better not to allow price discrimination if the price cap is close to the level of marginal cost. The consequences of tightening the price cap when discrimination is allowed are also examined.