Crime, Punishment, and Politics: An Analysis of Political Cycles in Criminal Sentencing
研究发现华盛顿州法官在政治周期末期对严重犯罪判刑更重，刑期长约10%，自由裁量偏离指南幅度增加50%，揭示了司法选举对量刑的影响。
We present evidence that Washington State judges respond to political pressure by sentencing serious crimes more severely. Sentences are around 10% longer at the end of a judge's political cycle than at the beginning; judges' discretionary departures above the sentencing guidelines range increase by 50% across the electoral cycle, accounting for much of the greater severity. Robustness specifications, nonlinear models, and falsification exercises allow us to distinguish among explanations for increased sentencing severity at the end of judges' political cycles. Our findings inform debates over judicial elections, and highlight the interaction between judicial discretion and the influence of judicial elections. © 2013 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.