Fund Advisor Compensation in Closed‐End Funds
研究封闭式基金溢价与基金管理人薪酬结构等组织特征的关系，发现薪酬对业绩敏感度越高、管理人资产越集中于该基金时，基金溢价越大。
This paper examines the relation between the premium on closed‐end funds and organizational features of the funds and advisors, including the compensation scheme of the investment advisor. We find that the fund premium is larger when: (a) the advisor's compensation is more sensitive to fund performance; (b) the assets managed by the advisor are concentrated in the fund in question; (c) the advisor manages other funds with low compensation sensitivity to performance and with low concentration of assets managed by the advisor; and (d) the advisor's compensation contract evaluates performance relative to a benchmark.