On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The Case of Complete Contracts
比较了两种合同交换模型：竞争性市场模型和合同设计者直接竞争模型，证明当交易者数量足够大时，瓦尔拉斯配置与直接竞争模型的均衡配置等价，且瓦尔拉斯分析中的预期假设与直接竞争问题中的非均衡路径猜想一致。
This paper explores two models of an economy in which contracts are exchanged. In the first model contracts are exchanged on a competitive market in which traders expectations concerning conditions that prevail within specific markets adjust until markets "clear" In the second model contract designers compete directly against one another by offering alternate contracts. It is shown that Walrasian allocations correspond with the equilibrium allocations in the model with direct competition when the number of traders is made large. Furthermore, the expectational assumptions that drive the Walrasian analysis coincide with off the equilibrium path conjectures in the problem with direct competition.