Incomplete Mechanisms and Efficient Allocation in Labour Markets
在包含逆向选择的瓦尔拉斯劳动力市场模型中分析效率，定义受约束有效的均衡，并证明在强单调经济中存在至少一个有效均衡。
Efficiency is analyzed in a Walrasian model of labour markets with adverse selection. Workers are distinguished by productivity and preferences; firms are distinguished by productivity and ability to distinguish workers. An equilibrium is defined to be constrained efficient if it cannot be dominated by an incomplete mechanism (IM). The set of equilibria turns out to have an interesting structure. Within the class of strongly monotonic economies, there exists at least one efficient equilibrium. Under slightly stronger conditions, an equilibrium is dominated by an IM only if it can be dominated by another equilibrium, that is, equilibria are Pareto-ranked.