Voice and Loyalty as a Delegation of Authority: A Model and a Test on Matched Worker‐Firm Panels
构建了一个理论模型，解释企业为何将权力下放给工人集体以换取忠诚，并利用法国工人-企业匹配面板数据验证了自愿签署企业级协议能降低员工离职率。
The authors model a mechanism that makes delegation of authority from a firm to a collective of workers profitable. Power is exchanged for loyalty. The model is tested using a matched panel of French workers and firms. For these firms, the authors know at two dates (1986 and 1992) whether a firm-level agreement has been signed. Furthermore, at these two dates and for each firm, a representative sample of the employees provides information on the individuals. The authors show both theoretically and empirically that the voluntary signature of such an agreement induces lower employee turnover given the structure of wages. Copyright 1997 by University of Chicago Press.