Learning by bidding
分析了一个动态二价拍卖模型，其中一位知情竞拍者和一位不知情竞拍者通过观察报价来学习自己的估值，揭示了均衡策略和秘密保留价的作用。
We analyze a dynamic second‐price auction with an informed bidder and an uninformed bidder who, upon seeing a posted price, learns whether his valuation is above that price. In the essentially unique equilibrium, an informed bidder bids in the first period if her valuation is below some cutoff and bids only in the last period otherwise. An uninformed bidder bids in every period to optimally change the price unless the price is above his valuation or he is the high bidder. This model also provides a rationale behind the use of a secret reserve price in private‐value settings.