Advance‐Purchase Discounts and Price Discrimination in Competitive Markets
研究当企业和消费者都不确定未来需求时,竞争性企业为何提供预售折扣,发现低估值消费者会提前购买,这类似二级价格歧视,但不需要企业有市场势力。
When both individual and aggregate consumer demand is uncertain and firms set prices before demand is known, price‐taking firms may offer advance‐purchase discounts. Consumers with relatively more certain demands and with relatively lower valuations have an incentive to buy in advance the presence of other consumers with higher valuations and more uncertain aggregate demand increases the price they expect to pay in the spot market. Advance‐purchase sales are made to low‐valuation customers, as predicted by traditional models of second‐degree price discrimination, without assuming that firms have market power.