Event Risk Bond Covenants, Agency Costs of Debt and Equity, and Stockholder Wealth
检验了债券契约中风险条款对债务和股权代理成本及股东财富的影响，发现发行事件风险保护债券比非保护债券更能提升股东财富，且这种提升主要源于降低债务代理成本。
We examine the effect of risk covenants in bond indentures on agency costs of debt and equity and stockholder wealth by testing two competing hypotheses for issuing event risk-protected bonds: the stockholder wealth enhancement hypothesis and the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. We find that the issuance of event risk-protected bonds has a more positive impact on stockholder wealth than the issuance of non-protected bonds. Regression analysis indicates that more positive stockholder gains are associated with firms characterized by higher agency costs of debt. These findings suggest that the presence of event risk covenants increases stockholder wealth primarily by lowering a firm's agency costs of debt.