The Macroeconomic Implications of Contract Models with Asymmetric Information
证明，在最优雇佣合同中引入不对称信息后，货币冲击能产生实际效应。企业经历自身私有的供给冲击，坏冲击时合同就业量过低。未预期的货币增长会提高价格和就业，并探讨了模型的宏观经济含义。
This paper shows that, with the imposition of asymmetric information, monetary shocks can have real effects in a model with optimal employment contracts. Firms are assumed to experience supply shocks that are their own private information. When a bad shock occurs, contractual employment is inefficiently low. Contracts depend upon the probability of a bad state occurring. If the aggregate price level is correlated with the firm's private information, contracts will depend upon prices. It is shown that an unanticipated increase in the money supply increases prices and employment. The authors explore the macroeconomic implications of the model. Copyright 1990 by Ohio State University Press.