Predatory Pricing and the Acquisition Cost of Competitors
研究掠夺性降价是否降低了托拉斯收购竞争对手的成本，基于1891-1906年美国烟草公司收购43家对手的数据，发现掠夺性定价显著降低了收购成本，并存在声誉效应。
This paper investigates whether predatory price cutting reduces a trust's cost of acquiring its competitors. A variant of the Litzenberger-Rao valuation model is estimated with the expenditures for 43 rival firms purchased by the old American Tobacco Company between 1891 and 1906. The coefficient estimates indicate that, ceteris paribus, alleged predation significantly lowered the acquisition costs of the tobacco trust both for asserted victims and, through reputation effects, for competitors that sold out peacefully. Although qualified by data limitations, these results support the classical view of predatory pricing as a systematic business practice.