Institutional Arrangements for Monetary Policy When Output Is Persistent
研究产出持续时相机抉择货币政策导致的通胀偏差和稳定偏差，提出通过名义收入目标或可行产出目标等制度安排来消除这些偏差，并讨论了中央银行家的偏好选择。
A discretionary monetary policy gives rise to a constant average inflation bias, a state-contingent inflation bias, and a stabilization bias when output is persistent. The paper considers institutional arrangements (contracts) for central banks that remove these policy imperfections. The average and state-contingent inflation biases can be removed by directing the central bank to target the growth of nominal income and appoint a central banker with a specific relative weight attached to output stabilization. An alternative to this institutional solution is to direct central banks to aim for a feasible output target. Although this would remove the inflationary biases, the government must appoint a liberal (as opposed to conservative) central banker in order to implement optimal stabilization.