Do Acquirers Manage Earnings Prior to a Share for Share Bid?
检验英国收购方在换股要约前是否进行盈余管理，发现证据支持这一行为，这对理解并购成败和收益分配有参考价值。
Abstract: Earnings management by acquirers ahead of share for share bids may affect whether a bid succeeds, and hence which management team controls the target's assets, as well as the distribution of gains between target and acquirer shareholders. This paper tests for such earnings management for the UK, the world's second largest takeover market, in the period 1997–2001 when M&A reached record levels and share for share deals came to account for the majority of expenditure. Using a range of approaches originating in Jones' model, the paper finds evidence consistent with earnings management ahead of share‐financed bids.