Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms
研究贝叶斯实施问题，提出增强显示原理：若存在机制能实现给定选择规则，则增强显示机制也能实现，并给出必要及充分条件。
Consider the problem of Bayesian implementation, i.e., of constructing mechanisms with the property that all Bayesian equilibrium outcomes agree with a given choice rule. We show that a general procedure is to start with an incentive-compatible revelation mechanism, and then augment agents' message spaces in order to eliminate undesired equilibria. Specifically, we present an Augmented Revelation Principle, which states that if there exists any mechanism that implements a given choice rule, then an augmented revelation mechanism will also implement it. This principle enables us to obtain necessary conditions for implementation. For a large class of environments these conditions are also sufficient.