Durable Goods Monopoly with Incomplete Information
研究垄断者边际成本为私人信息时的耐用品垄断问题，证明科斯猜想蕴含无交易定理，并构造了近似租赁模型结果的非科斯均衡。
This article reconsiders the durable goods monopoly problem when the monopolist's marginal cost is private information. We show that the Coase Conjecture implies the No Trade Theorem: In any equilibrium in which the lowest-cost seller's initial offer approaches her marginal cost, the aggregate probability of trade must vanish. However, we also construct non-Coasean equilibria which approximate the unique outcome of the rental version of the same model. These (stationary) equilibria are comparatively efficient. The results are equally applicable to the mathematically-equivalent problem of sequential bargaining with two-sided incomplete information where one party makes all the offers.