The Limits of Bureaucratic Efficiency
分析消费者投诉作为监督手段如何导致官僚低效，如忽视合理投诉、过度监控、拖延决策等，并指出官僚制仅在消费者不可信时使用，因此观察到的官僚制总是低效的。
Bureaucracies tend to be used when consumers cannot be trusted to choose outcomes efficiently. But a primary means of bureaucratic oversight is consumer complaints. But this can give bureaucrats an incentive to inefficiently accede to consumer demands to avoid a complaint. I show that when this incentive is important, bureaucracies (efficiently) respond by (i) ignoring legitimate consumer complaints, (ii) monitoring more in situations in which it is not needed, (iii) delaying decision making "too long, " and (iv) biasing oversight against consumers. I also show that bureaucracies are used only when consumers cannot be trusted. As a result, observed bureaucracies are always inefficient.