研发的动态博弈:专利保护与竞争行为

A Dynamic Game of R and D: Patent Protection and Competitive Behavior

Econometrica · 1982
被引 374
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

用微分博弈分析n家企业行业中的研发动态最优资源配置,计算并讨论了投资规则的纳什均衡,对理解专利保护下的企业竞争行为有参考价值。

Abstract

A theory of dynamic optimal resource allocation to R and D in an n-firm industry is developed using differential games. This technique represents a synthesis of the analytic methods previously applied to the problem: static game theory and optimal control. The use of particular functional forms allows the computation and detailed discussion of the Nash equilibrium in investment rules.

R&D动态博弈专利保护竞争行为纳什均衡