The Shareholder Role in the Family Business: Conflict of Interests and Objectives Between Nonemployed Shareholders and Top Management Team
基于代理理论，研究西班牙10家家族企业中非在职股东与高层管理团队的利益冲突，发现董事会中家族成员数量与股东承诺负相关，而外部董事数量则正相关。
This article focuses on the role of the family business shareholder. Based on Agency Theory, it examines the elements that influence the conflict of interests and objectives between nonemployed shareholders and the top management team and its impact on commitment to the family firm. Data were empirically obtained from a field study of 156 shareholders and executives of 10 Spanish family firms. Combining quantitative and qualitative data, investigation results show that the degree of commitment to the family business is negatively correlated with the number of family members on the board of directors. Nevertheless, the most robust and statistically significant correlation (positive) was found between the number of external board members and the commitment level of the nonemployed shareholders. Regarding the mechanisms and processes implemented, results depended on the attention that the family business paid to the institutional overlap of the three subsystems: ownership, family, and business.