House Allocation with Overlapping Generations
研究了大学宿舍分配等动态场景中，新生与老生共存的房屋分配问题，分析了基于资历的序列独裁和顶交易循环规则在动态帕累托效率和激励相容性方面的表现。
Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, each year college freshmen move in and seniors move out of on-campus housing. Each student stays on campus for only a few years. A student is a “newcomer” in the beginning and then becomes an “existing tenant.” Motivated by this observation, we introduce a model of house allocation with overlapping generations. In terms of a dynamic rule without monetary transfers, we examine two static rules of serial dictatorship and top trading cycles. We support these seniority-based rules in terms of their dynamic Pareto efficiency and incentive compatibility.