Bertrand-Edgeworth Duopoly with Proportional Residual Demand
完整刻画了存在产能约束时伯特兰-埃奇沃思双寡头企业的定价行为，发现纳什均衡涉及非退化混合策略，且价格不低于最高竞争价格，大企业可能以正概率设定垄断价格。
A complete characterization is given for the prices charged by Bertrand-Edgeworth duopolists with capacity constraints. In general, for the game in which firms' strategy spaces consist of price offers, Nash equilibrium involves nondegenerate mixed strategi es. Equilibria never extend below the highest competitive price. With tw o firms, the Bertrand-Edgeworth model displays a bias for the highest of several market clearing prices. Moreover, these strategies never stop short of the lowest monopoly price. If firms are of unequal siz e, the larger firm assigns positive probability to a monopoly price, possibly even to several monopoly prices. Copyright 1993 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.