Regulating Multiple Polluters: Deterrence and Liability Allocation
研究当单个企业排放不可观测时，如何规制多个污染者，分析污染威慑与治理资金之间的权衡，发现企业数量和监控能力会影响监管者福利。
We consider regulation of multiple polluters when individual emissions are unobservable. The tension between pollution deterrence and funding of remediation is examined under two constraints: that penalty revenues fully fund remediation costs and that the regulator cannot make positive transfers to firms. To isolate the effect of increasing the number of polluters, we compare an industry consisting of a single large firm with one in which many small firms in aggregate mimic the large firm. Contrary to previous findings, both the number of firms and the ability to monitor individual firms affect the welfare of a large class of regulators.