Community rating and choice between traditional health insurance and managed care
研究了在社区评级下允许消费者在传统保险和管理式医疗之间选择的影响，发现这种选择可能使两类人群都受益，也可能牺牲高成本人群的利益，并可能消除或产生新的低效率。
This paper analyses the consequences of allowing a choice between traditional insurance and managed care under community rating. A model of a competitive health insurance market is developed; with the risk equalization scheme being imperfect. There are two types of individuals who are characterized by different costs with respect to traditional insurance. Compared with a situation where traditional insurance is compulsory, allowing choice can make both types better off, can increase the utility of low-cost types at the expense of high-cost types, as well as having no effect. Inefficiencies under compulsory traditional insurance can be eliminated and new inefficiencies can be created. Market equilibria are not necessarily second best.