Mutual Fund Incentive Fees: Determinants and Effects
研究了意大利共同基金市场（截至2006年）中绩效费用条款的成因与效果，发现其更多源于资产管理公司的战略定价，而非解决信息不对称的有效机制。
We investigate the how and why of performance fee provisions in a free contracting environment such as the Italian mutual fund market until 2006. We find weak support for the hypothesis that these provisions emerge as an economically efficient solution in a rational asset management industry plagued by asymmetric information. They appear to emerge mainly as the product of strategic pricing by asset managers wishing to ease market competition, leverage on investors' sentiment, and hedge their cost structure. Alternatively, fears that managers may opportunistically alter funds' investment policies to maximize the option value embedded in the incentive provisions appear unjustified.