A Nonuniform Pricing Model of Union Wages and Employment
提出工会非统一定价模型，假设企业事后可关闭以避免支付，在此约束下即使工人和企业风险中性，就业也非最优；工会选择劳动力数量折扣并采用资历规则，降低工人就业概率、增加就业周期波动，且工会与非工会平均工资差异呈逆周期。
Unlike implicit contracts models, the nonuniform pricing model of unions assumes that firms can always shut down ex post to avo id any payments to the union. Under this restriction, employment can differ from a first-best even if both workers and firms are risk neut ral. In general, the union chooses to offer quantity discounts on lab or and needs to use a seniority rule that regulates the order in whic h workers are hired to implement these discounts. Unions lower (almos t) all workers' employment probabilities and increase the cyclical vo latility of employment, and the union-nonunion average wage different ial will move countercyclically. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.