Trigger Price Regulation
研究公共事业公司投资回报易受机会主义定价影响时，如何通过触发价格监管机制实现高效定价和投资，监管者将价格降至运营成本、公司削减投资以惩罚低效行为，从而达成自我执行的均衡。
We consider the difficulty of achieving efficient prices and investments when returns on a public utility's projects are vulnerable to opportunistic ratemaking. We model the long-term relationship between a firm and its regulator as a time-dependent supergame in which the regulator sets price ceilings to maximize surplus and the firm invests to maximize profit. We find history-dependent strategies that support self-enforcing, mutually beneficial equilibria. Equilibrium payoffs are close to the planning solution provided interest rates are small enough and capital depreciates fast enough. We concentrate on trigger price regulation where, in response to inefficient behavior, the regulator cuts price down to operating cost and the firm curtails investment. This mechanism performs well even with production economies and with restrictions on players' threats.