The Dynamics of Political Compromise
研究两党在反复互动中如何达成自我执行的政治或经济剩余分配，发现执政党的份额不仅取决于当前实力，还取决于其上次执政以来是否曾更强，且宪法中的超级多数要求可能适得其反地减少妥协。
We characterize efficient self‐enforcing divisions of political or economic surplus between two parties that interact repeatedly. The party in power can decide the allocation, and the parties' political strength changes according to a Markov process. We find that the share of the party currently in power depends not only on its current strength but also on whether it had previously been even stronger since it last came to power. We find that the constitutional supermajority requirements that attempt to constrain the use of power can counterproductively create less compromise.