Cross-Border Liability of Multinational Enterprises, Border Taxes, and Capital Structure
研究在不完全合同下，有限责任导致私人投资过度偏向高风险技术，而跨国企业因跨境责任不完全会加剧此问题，并探讨了相关金融管理政策及可检验的预测。
Under incomplete contracting, limited liability creates differential valuations of investments from private and government perspectives. Managers in the private sector tend to over-invest in risky technologies, compared to levels of investment that are optimal from the standpoint of the society as a whole. This problem is exacerbated from the point of view of the host government when a multinational enterprise (MNE) engages in cross-border investments but faces incomplete cross-border liability, since there is the likelihood of localization of costs and globalization of benefits. This paper explores financial management implications of policies for the MNE and derives some empirically testable predictions.